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dc.contributor.authorBarde, Sylvainen
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-24-
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:53:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:53:22Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50621-
dc.description.abstractAn information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to provide a methodology for predicting endowment distributions in the absence of information on agent preferences. The allocation problem is first presented as a stylised knapsack problem. Although this knapsack allocation is intractable, the social planner can nevertheless make precise predictions concerning the endowment distribution by using its information-theoretic structure. By construction these predictions do not rest on the rationality of agents. It is also shown, however, that the knapsack problem is equivalent to a congestion game under weak assumptions, which means that the planner can nevertheless evaluate the optimality of the unobserved allocation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Kent, School of Economics |cCanterburyen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Economics Discussion Papers |x11,03en
dc.subject.jelC02en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelD51en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInformation theoretic measureen
dc.subject.keywordknapsack problemen
dc.subject.keywordcongestion gameen
dc.subject.keywordpotential functionen
dc.titleIgnorance is bliss: Rationality, information and equilibrium-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654777837en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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