Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50592 
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dc.contributor.authorPatel, Amrishen
dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edwarden
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:52:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:52:58Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50592-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyse the effect that naïve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling naïve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational inferences. Naïve agents weaken the existence of social norms and reduce the range of actions that can become social norms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Kent, Department of Economics |cCanterburyen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper |x09,06en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsignallingen
dc.subject.keywordconformityen
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen
dc.subject.keywordnaïve beliefsen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.titleSocial norms and naïve beliefs-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn594004462en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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