Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50577 
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dc.contributor.authorAcharyya, Rajaten
dc.contributor.authorGarcía-Alonso, María del Carmenen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-21T16:52:45Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-21T16:52:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50577-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country chooses whether to allow parallel imports (PI) of on-patent drugs or market based discrimination (MBD). We show that, for a moderately high imitation cost, both (Strict IPR, Parallel Imports) and (Weak IPR, MBD) emerge as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) policy choices. For relatively smaller imitation costs, (Weak IPR, MBD) is the unique SPNE policy choice. The welfare properties reveal that although innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI), the market coverage and national welfare of the low-income country, and the total welfare are all lower. This opens up the efficiency issue of implementing TRIPS and at the same time allowing international exhaustion of patent rights.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Kent, School of Economics |cCanterburyen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Economics Discussion Papers |x09,19en
dc.subject.jelD4en
dc.subject.jelL1en
dc.subject.jelI1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpatent protectionen
dc.subject.keywordTRIPSen
dc.subject.keywordinnovationen
dc.subject.keywordimitationen
dc.subject.keywordparallel importsen
dc.subject.keywordpharmaceuticalsen
dc.subject.stwPatentrechten
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwPharmazeutische Forschungen
dc.subject.stwInnovationen
dc.subject.stwImitationswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleWeak IPR and imitation in the south and international exhaustion of patent rights in the north for innovated drugs: A policy game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn611462044en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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