Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50573 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 09,24
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
Many charities report donations using categories. We question whether such category reporting increases donations in a signalling game where a donor is either generous or not generous. Conditions are derived under which category reporting will increase giving or decrease giving. Category reporting will increase giving if the probability a donor is generous is low and/or donor preferences depend a lot on type. Category reporting will decrease giving if the probability a donor is generous is high and/or donor preferences depend little on type.
Schlagwörter: 
public good
charity
category reporting
signalling
JEL: 
C72
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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