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dc.contributor.authorMönnich, Christinaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-06T16:32:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-06T16:32:09Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50488-
dc.description.abstractAt the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were intended to serve two purposes: first, to prevent that tariffication would lead – at least on the short term – to a deterioration of market access and second, to create new, minimum market access. The since then observed fill rates do not match with these intentions, being often rather low. A wide-held suspicion explains this with tariff quota administration imposing an extra barrier to trade. It is the aim of this paper to test whether different administrative methods do indeed contribute to explain variation in fill rates and if so, how. A censored regression model for panel data was developed and applied to the EU’s TRQs for the years 1995–2000. The data supported the presumption that administration matters, sometimes in surprising ways.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aJustus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Zentrum für Internationale Entwicklungs- und Umweltforschung (ZEU) |cGiessenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x16en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelskontingenten
dc.subject.stwAgrarzollen
dc.subject.stwFinanzverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwZollpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAgrarprotektionismusen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.titleTariff rate quotas: Does administration matter?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn823273008en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zeudps:26465en

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