Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49922 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBerger, Helgeen
dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T16:12:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T16:12:38Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49922-
dc.description.abstractThe pending enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has brought to the fore the discussion of the voting right distribution in the European Central Bank (ECB) council. We show that, in a model where labor unions internalize the inflationary consequences of wage setting, deviating from a voting scheme based purely on economic size can be beneficial. Preliminary evidence on unemployment and voting rights in the ECB council seems broadly in line with this idea. We also point to possible policy implications for EMU enlargement and ECB restructuring.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2004/10en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen
dc.subject.keywordwage settingen
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Monetary Unionen
dc.subject.keywordEuropean Central Banken
dc.subject.keywordeuro areaen
dc.subject.keywordECB reformen
dc.subject.keywordEMU enlargementen
dc.subject.keywordaccession countriesen
dc.titleOne country, one vote? Labor market structure and voting rights in the ECB-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668828455en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200410en

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.