Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920
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dc.contributor.authorSchöb, Ronnieen_US
dc.contributor.authorThum, Marcelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T16:12:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T16:12:36Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920-
dc.description.abstractIndividual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFreie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSchool of Business & Economics Discussion Paper: Economics |x2011/14en_US
dc.subject.jelJ2en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.jelH5en_US
dc.subject.jelL5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMinimum wagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordhidden informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabour market regulationen_US
dc.titleJob protection renders minimum wages less harmfulen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn668790776en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201114-

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