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dc.contributor.authorHu, Yingyaoen_US
dc.contributor.authorMcAdams, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorShum, Matthewen_US
dc.description.abstractWe propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008). Unlike Krasnokutskaya (2009), we do not require that equilibrium bids scale with the unobserved heterogeneity. Our approach accommodates a wide variety of applications, including settings in which there is an unobserved reserve price, an unobserved cost of bidding, or an unobserved number of bidders, as well as those in which the econometrician fails to observe some factor with a non-multiplicative effect on bidder values.en_US
dc.publisher|aJohns Hopkins Univ., Dep. of Economics |cBaltimore, Md.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // the Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics |x553en_US
dc.subject.stwStatistischer Fehleren_US
dc.subject.stwNichtparametrisches Verfahrenen_US
dc.titleNonparametric identifcation of auction models with non-separable unobserved heterogeneityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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