Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49876
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dc.contributor.authorChang, Myong-Hunen_US
dc.contributor.authorHarrington, Joseph E.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T15:21:11Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T15:21:11Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49876-
dc.description.abstractTo explore the efficacy of a corporate leniency program, a Markov process is constructed which models the stochastic formation and demise of cartels. Cartels are born when given the opportunity and market conditions are right, while cartels die because of internal collapse or they are caught and convicted by the antitrust authority. The likelihood that a cartel, once identified, is convicted depends inversely on the caseload of the antitrust authority due to an implicit resource constraint. The authority also chooses an enforcement policy in terms of the fraction of non-leniency cases that it prosecutes. Using numerical analysis, the impact of a leniency program on the steady-state cartel rate is investigated. Holding the enforcement policy of the antitrust authority fixed, a leniency program lowers the frequency of cartels. However, the additional caseload provided by the leniency program induces the antitrust authority to prosecute a smaller fraction of cartel cases identified outside of the program. Because of this less aggressive enforcement policy, it is possible that the cartel rate is higher when there is a leniency program.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aJohns Hopkins Univ., Dep. of Economics |cBaltimore, Md.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // the Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics |x548en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKartellrechten_US
dc.subject.stwStraffreiheiten_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwKonzentrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe impact of a corporate leniency program on antitrust enforcement and cartelizationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn58852297Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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