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dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen
dc.contributor.authorSefton, Martinen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:30Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:30Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49698-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)'s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian's model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2010-14en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary contributionsen
dc.subject.keywordsequential contributionsen
dc.subject.keywordendogenous timingen
dc.subject.keywordaction commitmenten
dc.subject.keywordobservable delayen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwSpendeen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleEndogenous move structure and voluntary provision of public goods: Theory and experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640170293en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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