Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49697 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-02
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
A key open question for theories of reference-dependent preferences is what determines the reference point. One candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision. We find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low.
Schlagwörter: 
reference points
expectations
loss aversion
risk aversion
disappointment
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D01
D84
J22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.65 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.