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Autor:innen: 
Gächter, Simon
Nosenzo, Daniele
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-19
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual's cooperativeness and the individual's beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more optimistic than non-cooperators about the cooperativeness of followers. However, cooperative leaders contribute more than non-cooperative leaders even after controlling for optimism. We conclude that differing leader contributions by differing types of leader in large part reflects social motivations
JEL: 
A13
C92
D03
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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