Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49695
Authors: 
Anesi, Vincent
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-08
Abstract: 
This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a specific class of Markov perfect equilibria in these 'dynamic tournament games' yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We find that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.
Subjects: 
electoral competition
stable set
stationary Markov equilibrium
weak tournament
solution theory
JEL: 
C71
C73
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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