Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
|dc.description.abstract||It is well known that proposers have an advantage in the canonical model of bargaining in legislatures: proposers are sure of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in a coalition, a player receives more as a proposer than as a coalition partner. In this paper I show that, if parties differ in voting weight, it is possible for a party to donate part of its proposing probability to another party and be better-off as a result. This can happen even if the recipient never includes the donor in its proposals. Even though actually being the proposer is valuable, having a higher probability of being proposer may be harmful.||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aCeDEx discussion paper series |x2010-19||en_US|
|dc.subject.keyword||weighted majority games||en_US|
|dc.title||Bargaining in legislatures: A new donation paradox||en_US|
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.