Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49684 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-17
Publisher: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Abstract: 
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions is not as extreme as predicted and first movers do not attain their predicted firstmover advantage. In another parameterization we again find that the distribution of contributions is not as predicted when the first mover is predicted to free ride, but we find strong support for equilibrium predictions when the second mover is predicted to free ride. These results can be explained by second movers' willingness to punish first movers who free ride, and unwillingness to reward first movers who contribute.
Subjects: 
public goods
voluntary contributions
sequential moves
experiment
JEL: 
C92
D03
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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