Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49663
Authors: 
Bardsley, Nicholas
Mehta, Judith
Starmer, Chris
Sugden, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx discussion paper series 2008-17
Abstract: 
This paper reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context.
Subjects: 
salience
focal point
cognitive hierarchy
team reasoning
JEL: 
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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