Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49657 
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dc.contributor.authorNosenzo, Danieleen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:23:48Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:23:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49657-
dc.description.abstractThis study uses a three-person gift-exchange game experiment to examine the impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior. We compare effort choices made in a treatment where workers' wages are secret with effort choices made in two 'public wages' treatments. The two 'public wages' treatments differ in whether co-workers' wages are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experimenter. We find that pay comparison information has an overall detrimental impact on effort choices: employees respond less favorably to the wage offers made by the employer when they receive information about the wage paid to the co-worker as compared to the case where co-workers' wages are secret. These effects are particularly pronounced in the treatment where the level of the co-worker's wage is fixed exogenously.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2010-03en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelJ31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsocial comparisonsen
dc.subject.keywordwage comparisonsen
dc.subject.keywordgift exchangeen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwLohnen
dc.subject.stwVergleichen
dc.subject.stwVerhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleThe impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn632208392en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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