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dc.contributor.authorDe Groot, Olaf J.en
dc.contributor.authorShortland, Anjaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-30-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-09T13:10:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-09T13:10:55Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49416-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau's dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x1063en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelP48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPiracyen
dc.subject.keywordIllegal behaviouren
dc.subject.keywordLaw enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordLegal institutionsen
dc.subject.stwGovernance-Ansatzen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwSeeräuberen
dc.subject.stwSchifffahrten
dc.subject.stwKriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleGov-arrrgh-nance: Jolly Rogers and Dodgy Rulers-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn667372695en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1063en

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