Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49416
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dc.contributor.authorDe Groot, Olaf J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorShortland, Anjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-09T13:10:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-09T13:10:55Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49416-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we argue that the effect of governance on the emergence of crimes of different levels of sophistication is highly non-linear. State failure, anarchy and a lack of infrastructure are not conducive to establishing any business, including illicit enterprises. At the bottom of the spectrum, therefore, both legal business and criminal gangs benefit from improved governance. With further improvements in governance criminal activities decline. We find strong and consistent support for this hypothesis using the International Maritime Bureau's dataset on piracy. Piracy is reported by ship-owners, giving a unique insight into crime in badly governed countries which were systematically excluded from previous analyses. We show that profitable forms of piracy flourish where on the one hand there is stability and infrastructure, but on the other hand the state does not have the capacity to intervene and/or bureaucrats can be bribed to turn a blind eye. For minor acts of theft from ships the pattern is quadratic: piracy first rises and then falls as governance improves.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x1063en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelP48en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPiracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordIllegal behaviouren_US
dc.subject.keywordLaw enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordLegal institutionsen_US
dc.subject.stwGovernance-Ansatzen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwSeeräuberen_US
dc.subject.stwSchifffahrten_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleGov-arrrgh-nance: Jolly Rogers and Dodgy Rulersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn667372695en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1063en_US

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