Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48937 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere No. 07/1999
Verlag: 
Universität Greifswald, Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Greifswald
Zusammenfassung (übersetzt): 
The relationship between physician and patient has been discussed intensively in the literature. Nevertheless, they neglect the fact that the production of health not only depends on the medical services supplied by the physician but is also influenced by the patient's compliance. We present a model of medical treatment in which both the actions of physician and patient are modelled as a productive input. The consequences of a mutual asymmetric information about these inputs result in lower activity levels. Only in the case of strategic substitutes one level might be above the first-best level. The implementation of a coinsurance on the demand side raises the compliance of the patient. The influence on the amount of medical services depends on the strategic interaction, i.e. whether we face the case of strategic independence, strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
Schlagwörter: 
Double Moral Hazard
Komplemente
Substitute
JEL: 
I11
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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