Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48876
Authors: 
Vogt, Carsten
Sturm, Bodo
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 11-050
Abstract: 
In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit exceeds some critical value. Using data from the impact assessment model RICE and estimates for inequality aversion from the experimental literature, we show that this condition fails to hold for major countries involved in international climate policy.
Subjects: 
Climate policy
public good game
inequality aversion
voluntary cooperation
JEL: 
C72
D63
H41
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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