Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853
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dc.contributor.authorSchäfer, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Maik T.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-23T12:49:14Z-
dc.date.available2011-08-23T12:49:14Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48853-
dc.description.abstractWhile most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions' desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cLeipzigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper // Universität Leipzig |x96en_US
dc.subject.jelF10en_US
dc.subject.jelF13en_US
dc.subject.jelO10en_US
dc.subject.jelO30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Growthen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntellectual Property Rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordTradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Gameen_US
dc.subject.stwImmaterialgüterrechteen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwNord-Süd-Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNeue Wachstumstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEndogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growthen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn666351384en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:leiwps:96-

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