Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48710
Authors: 
Rau, Holger Andreas
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2011: Die Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft: Lektionen aus der Krise - Session: Experimental Economics I A9-V1
Abstract: 
We analyze the provision of a step-level public good in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how the order of moves and the introduction of a second step-level affects public-good provision. We find that the sequential-move game improves public-good provision and payoffs. An additional step-level does lead to higher contributions but the effect on public-good provision is ambiguous and insignificant. Based on an existing data set, we calibrate Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model of inequality aversion and find that actual behavior fits remarkably well with these predictions in a quantitative sense, but there are also two contradictions to the model's predictions.
Subjects: 
Experimental economics
sequential play
step-level public good
JEL: 
C92
D70
H41
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.