Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48630
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
University of Tübingen working papers in economics and finance 14
Abstract: 
We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a multi-agent framework with principals implementing a revenue sharing scheme. For a given number of agents, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for the agents, higher equilibrium effort levels and higher agent utility, but lower profits for the firms. The winners from antitrust policy are thus not only the consumers but also the agents employed by the competing firms.
Subjects: 
agency theory
strategic interfirm competition
revenue sharing
JEL: 
C72
L22
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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