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dc.contributor.authorGall, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorMasella, Paoloen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-15T14:21:48Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-15T14:21:48Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48350-
dc.description.abstractEconomic institutions determine prospects for growth and development. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy to support institutions that implement markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market allocation needs to be robust to coalitional expropriation. In a dynamic setting, market payoffs may induce sufficient inequality in next period's endowments for markets to alternate with expropriation in a limit cycle, decreasing efficiency and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. Long run stability of markets is favored by higher social mobility, more initial equality, and less mismatch between demand and supply.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |cKiel und Hamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 |x30en
dc.subject.jelE02en
dc.subject.jelO43en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExpropriationen
dc.subject.keywordmarket institutionsen
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.keywordfluctuationsen
dc.subject.keywordcoalition formationen
dc.titleMarkets and Jungles-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn66532698Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec11:30en

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