Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48147
Authors: 
Berlemann, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Dresden discussion paper in economics 10/03
Abstract: 
We report and analyze the results of a series of classroom experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods. Using fixed effect panel regression models we find that cooperation significantly increases when participants are forced to guess the degree of overall cooperation. We also find that the possibility to make announcements during the experiment enhances cooperation significantly although these commitments are not binding and heavily used for cheating purposes. We suggest that this effect is due to attempts at restoring the announcements' reputation in the aftermath of heavy cheating.
Subjects: 
Experimental Economics
Public Goods
Cheap Talk
Signalling
Communication
Expectations
JEL: 
C91
D74
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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