Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47618 
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dc.contributor.authorBrunekreeft, Gerten
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-06T15:53:50Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-06T15:53:50Z-
dc.date.issued1997-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47618-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares two regulatory devices for handling (access to) bottlenecks in deregulated network industries: (1) a local price cap and (2) a global price cap, the latter of which applies the efficient component pricing rule. The local price cap restricts profit regulation to the bottleneck, whereas a complementary set of measures intends to curb the resulting incentives for foreclosure of the competitive markets. The global price cap extends regulation to the entire firm, which should take away the foreclosure incentives. This major advantage of the global price cap is contrasted to possible disadvantages, which centre around renewed foreclosure incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aAlbert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik |cFreiburg i. Br.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeitrag |x36en
dc.subject.jelL43en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelL9en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwNetzzugangen
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleLocal versus global price cap: A comparison of foreclosure incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn820029726en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:aluivr:36en

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