Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47436
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dc.contributor.authorKnieps, Günteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T15:06:02Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T15:06:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47436-
dc.description.abstractIn order to analyse the role of competition in the post-trade markets a normative network economic analysis of the securities business is provided. The theory of monopolistic bottlenecks constitutes the theoretical reference point for this analysis in order to identify stable network specific market power. It is shown that clearing and settlement are competitive value-added telecommunications services and therefore do not justify ex ante market power regulation. Precondition for competition on the markets for clearing and settlement is nondiscriminatory access to the complementary technical regulatory function - the notary function (authenticity, registry, links between competing end custodians).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. für Verkehrswiss. und Regionalpolitik |cFreiburg i. Br.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge // Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik |x101 [rev.]en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23015en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleCompetition in the post-trade markets: A network economic analysis of the securities businessen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn663377374en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:aluivr:101r-

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