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dc.contributor.authorHolden, Steinaren
dc.contributor.authorRosén, Åsaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:43:32Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:43:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47333-
dc.description.abstractWe study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain ex ante, there may exist a discriminatory equilibrium where workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will use longer time to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for the firms to hire the discriminated workers, thus sustaining discrimination. In contrast to standard models, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate also for firms without discriminatory preferences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2009,22en
dc.subject.jelJ70en
dc.subject.jelJ60en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDiscriminationen
dc.subject.keywordEmployment Protectionen
dc.subject.keywordHiring Standardsen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktdiskriminierungen
dc.subject.stwArbeitnehmerschutzen
dc.subject.stwPersonalauswahlen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDiscrimination and emplyoment protection-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610452150en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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