Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47333
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dc.contributor.authorHolden, Steinaren_US
dc.contributor.authorRosén, Åsaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:43:32Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:43:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47333-
dc.description.abstractWe study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain ex ante, there may exist a discriminatory equilibrium where workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will use longer time to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for the firms to hire the discriminated workers, thus sustaining discrimination. In contrast to standard models, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate also for firms without discriminatory preferences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo |cOsloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo |x2009,22en_US
dc.subject.jelJ70en_US
dc.subject.jelJ60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDiscriminationen_US
dc.subject.keywordEmployment Protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordHiring Standardsen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzsuchmodellen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktdiskriminierungen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitnehmerschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalauswahlen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDiscrimination and emplyoment protectionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn610452150en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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