Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47296 
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dc.contributor.authorAsheim, Geir B.en
dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leifen
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jonen
dc.contributor.authorHoyland, Bjornen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:42:46Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:42:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47296-
dc.description.abstractWe provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity significantly. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2008,26en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSelf-serving Biasen
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Economicsen
dc.subject.keywordDictator Gameen
dc.subject.stwExperimentelle Ökonomiken
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwEigeninteresseen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleSelf-serving dictators-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn583844588en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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