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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2008,23
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a 'narrow but deep' treaty with a 'broad but shallow' treaty.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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