Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47109
Authors: 
Lorz, Jens Oliver
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 779
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the impact of international capital mobility on redistributive capital taxation and on lobbying activities by interest groups. It employs a model where different capital endowments lead to a conflict between households concerning their most preferred capital tax rate. Three main results are derived: First, redistributive source based capital taxes or subsidies decline as international tax competition intensifies. Second, lobbying activities of certain interest groups may explain international differences in the capital tax rate. Third, capital mobility may lead to declining lobbying activities of interest groups and thus may be welfare increasing for all households.
Subjects: 
Tax competition
interest groups
redistribution
JEL: 
F42
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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