Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47083
Authors: 
Rauscher, Michael
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 732
Abstract: 
It has been argued in the literature that, interjurisdictional competition forces the public sector to increase its efficiency and thus helps to tame Leviathan governments. The paper addresses this hypothesis by means of a simple taxcompetition model with a Leviathan state. It is seen that the effects of increased factor mobility on the efficiency of the public sector are ambiguous. A calibration of the model shows that a reduction in public-sector efficiency is possible for parameter constellations which are not unrealistic.
JEL: 
F20
H21
H40
H73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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