Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47042
Authors: 
Stähler, Frank
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 647
Abstract: 
In an international setting, sovereignty of countries imposes serious problems on compliance and participation for a multilateral environmental agreement. This paper discusses both problems simultaneously in a three-country-setting. It employs a repeated-game-model and develops some basic conditions which agreements must meet. These conditions are applied on a specific model which allows only a subcoalition of two countries to join an agreement. However, this subcoalition is able to introduce transfer policies which initiate extra reductions of the outsider country. The paper shows that transfer policies may be based on a cost-inferior technology which makes non-compliance less attractive.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
884.44 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.