Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47036
Authors: 
Stähler, Frank
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 858
Abstract: 
This paper discusses the issue of competitiveness and environmental regulation from the viewpoint of strategic environmental policy models. It demonstrates that the incentive for strategic policies is determined only by the reaction of the opponent. Furthermore, it shows that the conditions under which relatively strict environmental policies may lead to an increase in the profits of the domestic industry are rather artificial. The result depends in a rather complex way on the type of competition and several effects of research and development or environmental quality specification, and on the assumption that a unilateral policy is possible.
JEL: 
Q20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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