Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46933
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dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:06:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:06:13Z-
dc.date.issued1993en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46933-
dc.description.abstractThis paper demonstrates that partial cooperation with respect to the use of an international environmental resource can emerge when countries are able to opt to breach an agreement. Although the option of non-compliance restricts the set of coalitions on those which embrace merely two members, broader cooperation can emerge when these two countries compensate a third country for extra reduction efforts. The paper discusses also a reversible and- a irreversible technology option and demonstrates that compensating a third country for the introduction of an irreversible technology may be even advantageous for the donors when this technology incurs higher costs than a reversible one.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x600en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the economics of international environmental agreementsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:600-
dc.identifier.printppn257084347en_US

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