Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Herrmann, Roland
Year of Publication: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1986
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 272
It has been largely ignored in the commodity stabilization literature that export quota schemes can cause a co-existence between a controlled and an uncontrolled market. This article analyzes the welfare implications of such a scheme on non-participating importing countries. The determinants of the welfare effects are elaborated. It is shown that non-participation in the export quota scheme may increase or decrease the importing countries' welfare compared to the situation of a liberalized world market. Magnitude and sign of the welfare impacts are shown to depend crucially on the rigidity of the quota policy. From the individual importing country's point of view, it is derived that non-participation instead of entering the agreement may raise national welfare, even if the export quota policy lowers its welfare level compared to a free trade situation.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Document Version: 
Digitized Version

Files in This Item:
904.83 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.