Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46925 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorLorz, Jens Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:04:53Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:04:53Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.citation|nInstitut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) |lKiel |y1999en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46925-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper redistribution policy is analyzed in a 2-period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals and asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. Individuals of the same generation differ with respect to their labor productivity. In each period, the respective government decides not only about the distribution of consumption between the working generation and the retired but also about the distribution within generations - between individuals with a high and with a low productivity of labor. The government in period 1 is not able to determine the policy of the subsequent government in period 2. In the political equilibrium, consumption of high- and low-productivity individuals is inefficiently allocated over their life cycle. For a given level of aggregate savings, a Pareto-improvement would be achieved, if high-productivity individuals consumed less during their working life and more during retirement in the following period, whereas low-productivity individuals had to consume more during their working life and less during retirement. In addition to this inefficiency, the government in period 1 may choose an inefficient level of aggregate savings in the equilibrium. It is shown for a specific example that an increase in aggregate savings would be Pareto-improving.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute of World Economics (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x904en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOverlapping generationsen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen
dc.subject.stwGenerationenbeziehungenen
dc.subject.stwOverlapping Generationsen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSparenen
dc.subject.stwIntertemporale Allokationen
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe political economy of intra- and intergenerational redistribution with asymmetric information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:904en
dc.identifier.printppn265587654en
dc.date.issuedonline2011en
dc.publisher.online|aZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |cKiel, Hamburgen
econstor.documentversionDigitized Versionen
econstor.citation.publisherInstitut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)en
econstor.citation.publisherplaceKielen
econstor.citation.year1999en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
668.45 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.