Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46850 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1993
Quellenangabe: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1993
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 579
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents an analysis of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It advances the view that the Developing World did not exploit its relatively strong bargaining position in negotiations over sidepayments and that the concessional ten-year grace period for Jess developed countries is a cause of instability of the agreement. The paper derives conditions under which sidepayments and sanctions can produce stable cooperation. It applies basic non-cooperative game theory and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as solution concept and compares the non-cooperative outcome with the Nash bargaining solution of a hypothetical cooperative game.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Dokumentversion: 
Digitized Version

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.45 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.