Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46749
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dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T14:56:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T14:56:58Z-
dc.date.issued1993en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46749-
dc.description.abstractThis paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that serious complications can arise if the resource-owner can vary the compensation price. In that case, extraction-driven stock preservation policies can conflict with compensation-driven ones and imply instability. Whether compensation policies can neglect this aspect depends crucially on the credibility of sticky compensation prices.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x580en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleOn international compensations for environmental stocksen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:580-
dc.identifier.printppn256940053en_US

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