Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46575
Authors: 
Bernergard, Axel
Wärneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Empirical and Theoretical Methods 3378
Abstract: 
Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.
Subjects: 
mass action
finite population games
evolutionary stability
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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