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dc.contributor.authorvan der Ploeg, Fredericken
dc.contributor.authorRohner, Dominicen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:21:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:21:06Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46547-
dc.description.abstractAlthough the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3244en
dc.subject.jelD45en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelL71en
dc.subject.jelQ34en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordnatural resourcesen
dc.subject.keywordprivate resource exploitationen
dc.subject.keywordmining investmenten
dc.subject.keywordlicense feeen
dc.subject.stwRohstoffressourcenen
dc.subject.stwRessourcenökonomiken
dc.subject.stwRohstoffpolitiken
dc.subject.stwBürgerkriegen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWar and natural resource exploitation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640577652en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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