Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46518 
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dc.contributor.authorBaharad, Eyalen
dc.contributor.authorGoldberger, Jacoben
dc.contributor.authorKoppel, Mosheen
dc.contributor.authorNitzan, Shmuelen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-18-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:35Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46518-
dc.description.abstractThe difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3323en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsparadoxonen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBeyond condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting records-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659079097en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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