Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46468
Authors: 
Kovenock, Dan
Roberson, Brian
Sheremeta, Roman M.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Empirical and Theoretical Methods 3211
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic 'guerilla warfare' strategy - in which a single random target is attacked - more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.
Subjects: 
Colonel Blotto
conflict resolution
weakest-link
best-shot
multi-dimensional resource allocation
experiments
JEL: 
C72
C91
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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