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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Vida, Péter | en |
dc.contributor.author | Forges, Francoise | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-29T11:19:26Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-29T11:19:26Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3360 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D70 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Bayesian game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | cheap talk | en |
dc.subject.keyword | communication equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | correlated equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | pre-play communication | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kommunikation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 659466902 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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