Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455
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dc.contributor.authorVida, Péteren_US
dc.contributor.authorForges, Francoiseen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:26Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:26Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455-
dc.description.abstractWe show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation |x3360en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBayesian gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordcheap talken_US
dc.subject.keywordcommunication equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordpre-play communicationen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleImplementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player caseen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659466902en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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