Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455 
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dc.contributor.authorVida, Péteren
dc.contributor.authorForges, Francoiseen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-23-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:26Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:26Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455-
dc.description.abstractWe show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3360en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBayesian gameen
dc.subject.keywordcheap talken
dc.subject.keywordcommunication equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordpre-play communicationen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwKommunikationen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleImplementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659466902en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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