Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455
Authors: 
Vida, Péter
Forges, Francoise
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3360
Abstract: 
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
Subjects: 
Bayesian game
cheap talk
communication equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
pre-play communication
JEL: 
C72
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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