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dc.contributor.authorPérez-Castrillo, Daviden
dc.contributor.authorQuérou, Nicolasen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:25Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:25Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46454-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is 'smoother' in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3394en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordNIMBYen
dc.subject.stwProjektbewertungen
dc.subject.stwStandortwahlen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwShapley-Werten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSmooth multibidding mechanisms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn660154633en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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