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dc.contributor.authorItaya, Jun-ichien
dc.contributor.authorOkamura, Makotoen
dc.contributor.authorYamaguchi, Chikaraen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:08Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46440-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three heterogenous countries with respect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3240en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.jelF59en
dc.subject.jelF21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax coordinationen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric countriesen
dc.subject.keywordrepeated gameen
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragsteueren
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen
dc.subject.stwFaktorproportionentheoremen
dc.subject.stwKapitalen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePartial harmonization of corporate taxes in an asymmetric repeated game setting-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640577288en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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