Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404 
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dc.contributor.authorWatkins, Williamen
dc.contributor.authorBohn, Henningen
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:18:28Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:18:28Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46404-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a 'stubborn liberal' policy maker can use precommitted spending to prevent a later conservative government from imposing decisive spending cuts. In a model where parties differ about spending priorities, reelection uncertainty creates a permanent bias towards higher government spending and higher taxes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3462en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordgovernment spendingen
dc.subject.keywordpartisan politicsen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordprecommitmenten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Ausgabenen
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken
dc.subject.stwParteipolitiken
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwStaatsquoteen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePrecommitted government spending and partisan politics-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn661655644en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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